CAA Records: Restrict Which CA Can Issue for Your Domain

A CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) record is a DNS record — type 257 — that declares which certificate authorities (CAs) may issue certificates for your domain. By default any publicly trusted CA can issue for your name once it validates control; once you publish CAA, a CA not named in it must refuse. Every publicly trusted CA has been required to check CAA before issuance since September 2017. The minimum useful configuration is a single issue record at the apex naming the CA you actually use, plus issuewild ";" if you never want a wildcard.
Core concepts
Quick reference
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Record type | CAA, type number 257 |
| Specs | RFC 8659 (obsoletes RFC 6844); parameter extensions in RFC 8657 (accounturi, validationmethods) |
| Mandatory for CAs since | September 2017, Baseline Requirements §3.2.2.8 |
| Structure | flags · tag · value, e.g. 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
| Tags | issue (non-wildcard + wildcard), issuewild (wildcard only), iodef (misissuance reports) |
| flags = 128 | Critical: a CA that does not understand the tag must refuse to issue |
| Lookup | Start at the exact name, strip the leftmost label upward, use the first RRset found |
| Reuse window | A CA may issue "within the TTL of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater" |
| Deny wildcards | issuewild ";" |
| Deny everything | issue ";" — this also blocks renewals, so test on a subdomain first |
What a record looks like
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 iodef "mailto:[email protected]"Syntax: example.com. CAA <flags> <tag> "<value>"; flags 0 is normal, 128 is critical. The value is a quoted string: a CA domain for issue/issuewild, or a mailto:/https: URL for iodef.
issue and issuewild override, not complement
Per RFC 8659 §4.3, a lone issue record authorizes that CA for wildcards too. But publish any issuewild record and wildcard requests are judged by issuewild alone — the issue lines no longer count for wildcards. That means adding your first issuewild record can silently break wildcard issuance until you name the CA there explicitly.
To forbid wildcards, publish an empty one:
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issuewild ";"The lookup: closest set wins; CNAMEs follow the target
The CA queries the exact name in the certificate (say shop.example.com), then strips the leftmost label to try example.com, then com, and uses the first RRset it finds. Three consequences: apex records cover every subdomain; a subdomain with its own CAA RRset replaces the parent policy rather than adding to it (records within one RRset are additive — each issue line authorizes one CA, and any single permission suffices); and debugging requires walking the tree label by label, because checking only the apex hides subdomain-specific policies.
For CNAMEs, the target's CAA applies: RFC 8659 §3 leaves CNAME handling to the resolver's normal lookup, so a CAA query for a CNAMEd name returns the target zone's records. If the target has none, the search climbs the original name's parents — RFC 8659 removed RFC 6844's CNAME tree-climbing. If you CNAME a subdomain to a CDN or PaaS, that provider's zone policy is what governs issuance.
Parameters and issuer identity (RFC 8657)
Text after a semicolon is a parameter whose meaning RFC 8659 leaves to the named CA. Let's Encrypt documents two of its own:
- accounturi restricts issuance to a single ACME account;
- validationmethods restricts it to http-01, dns-01 or tls-alpn-01.
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org;accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/1234567;validationmethods=dns-01"Both shrink the attack surface, and both must be updated whenever your automation changes — otherwise renewals fail silently.
CAA values use the names each CA publishes — the Issuer Domain Name, not the brand — and the Baseline Requirements require CAs to list the issuer domain names they recognize in their CP/CPS. Google Trust Services is pki.goog; cloudflare.com publishes comodoca.com, which Sectigo's CP/CPS still recognises as a transitional, deprecated issuer domain name; sectigo.com, trust-provider.com and usertrust.com are the current names. Copying another domain's CAA set copies its history — check each CA's current documentation instead of guessing from the brand. Sectigo CP/CPS §4.2.4
iodef, the issuance window, DNSSEC and auto-injected records
iodef is a reporting endpoint for policy violations, and it is best effort but still worth publishing. The Baseline Requirements only say a CA SHOULD send misissuance reports there, and only mailto:/https: URLs are expected (BR §4.2.2.1). Without it, misissuance attempts have no return address at all.
Issuance window. After reading your record, a CA may issue "within the TTL of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater" (BR §4.2.2.1). A 60-second TTL does not make a change instant — don't mistake "still inside the window" for "record not applied".
DNSSEC. Since 2026-03-15 the Baseline Requirements require CAs to DNSSEC-validate their own CAA lookups back to the root trust anchor, treating failure as "do not issue," never as permission (§4.2.2.2.2, §4.2.2.2.5). Operationally: a broken DNSSEC chain is no longer a warning, it blocks issuance. CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements · SC-085v2 (DNSSEC CAA lookups).
Managed DNS may add records for you. Some providers auto-inject CAA records for their certificate partners once a zone has any CAA record of its own (Cloudflare is a documented case). Partner sets drift, so entries for CAs no longer on the list can linger in your zone. Re-check what you actually publish every quarter.
Issue and renew in 7 steps
Step 1 — List every CA you use or might use
Include production certs, backups, CDN-issued certs, and internal PKI. Missing one means your own CAA blocks you during a migration. The SSL Checker and Certificate Decoder show each live certificate's issuer.
Step 2 — Inspect what is already published
Query the apex and every hostname you intend to issue for:
dig +short example.com CAA
dig +short www.example.com CAA
dig +short shop.example.com CAA
dig +short shop.example.com CNAME # if CNAMEd, also query the target zoneAn empty NOERROR answer means the CA walks up to the parent; 0 issue "..." means this RRset is the final policy. The CAA checker does this without a terminal.
Step 3 — Design the policy
Baseline: allow only the CA you use; publish issuewild ";" if you don't need wildcards; enable accounturi on production names and leave staging unbound. Cross-check from several public resolvers with dig (and dig example.com CAA +dnssec to confirm DNSSEC is healthy) to confirm global visibility of the records.
Step 4 — Publish the records
; Let's Encrypt only, no wildcards, report to security mailbox
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issuewild ";"
example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 iodef "mailto:[email protected]"
; staging subdomain: wildcards allowed, bound to one account + dns-01
staging.example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org;accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/1234567"
staging.example.com. 3600 IN CAA 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org;accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/1234567;validationmethods=dns-01"staging.example.com. has its own RRset, which replaces rather than inherits the apex policy.
Step 5 — Record the window
Note publish time and TTL. A CA may rely on the old data for up to the greater of TTL or 8 hours, so don't judge a tightening as failed too early.
Step 6 — Test with a real staging issuance
Validate tightening changes on a subdomain or staging environment first. issue ";" is the dangerous one: it blocks renewals too, so test it on a subdomain.
Step 7 — Monitor
Re-dig apex and key subdomains monthly to catch injected partner records drifting; put "ACME account change" and "CAA change" in the same runbook; and watch CT logs — certificate transparency shows you certificates someone else obtained for your name far more reliably than waiting for an iodef mail, see Certificate Transparency Logs Explained.
Troubleshooting checklist
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| CAA record for ... prevents issuance | The CA is not in the issue list | Check the hostname first, then walk up the parents to find which RRset actually governs |
| Non-wildcard works, wildcard fails | An issuewild record exists without that CA in it (RFC 8659 §4.3) | Add the CA to issuewild, or drop issuewild so issue covers wildcards again |
| Wildcard works, non-wildcard fails | You published only issuewild and forgot issue | Publish an issue record for that CA |
| Still failing after a change | You are inside the greater-of-TTL-or-8-hours window | Wait out the old TTL; confirm authoritative sync and recursive cache expiry |
| One subdomain only | It has its own RRset that replaces the parent policy | Walk the tree label by label |
| Subdomain is a CNAME to a third party | The target zone's CAA governs | Contact the provider or change the hosting setup |
| DNSSEC-related failure | Since 2026-03-15 a failed CAA lookup validation means "do not issue," not "allow" | Check the DS/RRSIG chain and key rollover state |
| Unfamiliar CA in your records | Auto-injected partner records from your DNS provider | Clean up as needed and re-review |
| Mass failure after an accounturi migration | The new account URI was never synced into DNS | Update DNS in the same change as the ACME account |
| Timeouts or SERVFAIL | A CAA error can also mean DNS could not be queried reliably | Fix authoritative/DNSSEC/timeout problems before retrying |
Next step
Enter your hostnames, wildcard needs and validation method (HTTP-01 vs DNS-01, wildcard certificate setup) into the SSL certificate selector; the tool filters by scenario, validation method and price — it does not read CAA records, so verify your CAA policy separately. If something was issued in error, follow Certificate Revocation: OCSP and CRL.
SSL certificate selector: filters by scenario, validation method and price. It does not read CAA records — verify your CAA policy with the CAA checker.
Tools: CAA checker to query records · SSL Checker to audit live certificates · Certificate Decoder to read issuers
Related: Certificate Transparency Logs Explained · Certificate Revocation: OCSP and CRL · SSL Certificate Formats Explained
Go deeper: SSL certificate guide · Certificate types
FAQ
What is the risk of publishing no CAA at all?
Nothing stops any publicly trusted CA from issuing for your domain; a validation bug at any one CA puts your name in scope.
If I only publish issue, can wildcards still be issued?
Yes. A lone issue record authorizes that CA for wildcards as well.
Can I block issuance entirely?
Yes: issue ";". It blocks renewals too, so verify on a subdomain before touching production.
Does CAA help if a subdomain is taken over?
Meaningfully: an attacker who controls validation for a subdomain can still only use the CA you named, and accounturi narrows it further to one account.
Is iodef mandatory?
No — the BRs only say a CA SHOULD report there. It is still worth configuring a mailbox you actually read.
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