Certificate Transparency Logs: SCTs, Monitoring and crt.sh

Certificate Transparency Logs Explained: How to Search, Monitor and Catch Unauthorised Issuance
Direct answer: Certificate Transparency (CT) is the public ledger of publicly trusted TLS (often called SSL) certificates. Before issuing, a CA records the certificate in public append-only logs and receives a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) as proof of logging; browsers check the SCT during validation and reject certificates without a valid one. CT matters to you twice over: for compliance (Chrome has required CT compliance for all publicly trusted certificates issued on or after 1 May 2018, and for EV certificates since 1 January 2015), and for security — anyone can list every certificate ever issued for a domain and spot "shadow" certificates nobody requested.
Key terms
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| CT log | Append-only public ledger, run independently by Google, Cloudflare, Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo and others |
| Precertificate | What the CA submits before issuing, carrying a "poison" extension that makes it unusable |
| SCT | Signed Certificate Timestamp — the receipt proving the certificate was logged |
| Monitor / Auditor | Monitors scan logs continuously; auditors verify log consistency |
Core concepts
1. Why the ledger cannot be rewritten
Logs are Merkle trees: leaves are certificates, parents are hashes of children (RFC 9162 uses 0x00/0x01 prefixes to separate leaf and node hashes). The log periodically signs the root hash, tree size and timestamp as a Signed Tree Head. An inclusion proof shows a certificate is in the tree; a consistency proof shows a newer tree head extends an older one without altering earlier entries — dropping or rewriting entries makes proofs fail. The protocol was defined in RFC 6962 and succeeded by RFC 9162.
2. Three ways to deliver an SCT
Embedded in the certificate's X.509v3 extension, delivered via a TLS extension during the handshake, or delivered via OCSP stapling. Because many servers do not support the latter two, CAs typically embed SCTs directly.
3. How many SCTs you need
Chrome CT Policy: validity ≤180 days → 2 SCTs from distinct logs; over 180 days → 3 SCTs. The older 15/27/39-month tiers no longer apply.
For embedded SCTs there is an additional requirement: at least one from a Google-operated log and at least one from a non-Google log, each in a compliant state at validation time.
4. Log state can change a certificate's status retroactively
Log states are Pending, Qualified, Usable, ReadOnly, Retired and Rejected. Only SCTs from logs in a recognised-good state count toward compliance, so an already-issued certificate can lose CT compliance if its log is later retired — which is exactly why continuous monitoring is needed.
5. Delivery paths are tightening
Per readings of Chrome Root Program Policy v1.8 (updated 15 June 2026), CAs must log every TLS server-authentication precertificate to at least one log Chrome recognises as Usable or Qualified before issuance; and Chrome 148 (released 5 May 2026) removed support for SCTs delivered via OCSP stapling, so SCTs must now be embedded or delivered through the TLS extension.
Put it to work in 4 steps
Step 1 — List every certificate issued for your domain. Search crt.sh or the built-in CT log lookup, or inspect a single certificate's embedded SCT list with the Certificate Decoder to confirm the log operators satisfy the "distinct operators" requirement.
Step 2 — Check the naming boundaries. Subdomains you do not recognise usually come from forgotten test environments or decommissioned hosts whose DNS records were never cleaned up.
Step 3 — Set up continuous monitoring. Below roughly 50 certificates, crt.sh or Certspotter alongside your renewal tooling is enough; at larger scale use automated monitoring with filtering and alerting. Alert on two events above all: a certificate issued for your domain that you did not request, and a certificate from an unexpected CA.
Step 4 — Respond to unauthorised issuance. Preserve evidence (log ID, serial number, issuance time), ask the issuing CA to revoke and open a mis-issuance report, then review whether your CAA records are too permissive (audit them with the CAA checker).
Troubleshooting checklist
| Symptom | Meaning | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Chrome shows ERR_CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_REQUIRED | Certificate not logged, or too few SCTs | Reissue; verify embedded SCT count and operators |
| Browser fails but openssl succeeds | openssl does not check CT by default | Trust the browser; inspect the SCTs |
| Previously compliant, now failing | The log that issued the SCT has been Retired | Reissue so SCTs come from currently compliant logs |
| Legacy setup relying on OCSP-delivered SCTs broke | Recent Chrome removed that delivery method | Move to embedded SCTs or the TLS extension |
| Internal/private CA certificate rejected | Private CAs do not log publicly | Use a publicly trusted certificate, or exempt via enterprise policy |
| Unknown subdomains in search results | Leftover environments or stale DNS | Clean up DNS and add to monitoring |
Go deeper
Tools: Certificate Decoder · SSL Checker · CSR Generator
Related: Certificate Revocation: OCSP and CRL · CAA Records Explained · SSL Certificate Formats Explained
Deep dives: SSL Certificates: The Complete Guide · Certificate Types Compared · SSL certificate selector
FAQ
Do CT logs expose my private key?
No. Logs contain certificate data only — public key, hostnames, validity period. Private keys are never submitted.
Does a wildcard expose my subdomains?
No. A wildcard publishes only *.example.com; the individual subdomains never appear in the certificate. A SAN certificate listing each host publishes every name.
Does querying CT require an account or payment?
No. Public search interfaces such as crt.sh are free.
How many SCTs does my certificate need?
Under Chrome CT Policy, certificates valid less than 15 months need 2 SCTs from distinct logs, and for embedded SCTs at least one must come from a Google log and one from a non-Google log. With lifetimes capped at 200 days, plan for 2.
Someone issued a certificate for my domain — what now?
Ask the issuing CA to revoke it immediately and file a mis-issuance report, tighten your CAA records, and audit whether your DNS account was compromised.
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